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PDF(6564 KB)
PDF(6564 KB)
Chiplet硬件安全综述:从攻击面分析到测试验证
A review of Chiplet hardware security: from attack-surface analysis to testing and verification
Chiplet系统由多个独立设计、制造和测试的芯粒集合而成,为后摩尔时代高性能计算提供了重要路径。然而,新型Chiplet场景重构了传统单片系统级芯片(system-on-chip,SoC)的硬件安全边界,并对安全测试提出了新的要求。文中综述Chiplet硬件安全威胁、防御机制与测试验证研究,分析现有SoC安全测试技术在Chiplet场景下的适用性,归纳面向Chiplet场景的新型测试需求,并提出面向组合信任的芯粒生命周期安全测试与验证流程,同时分析测试基础设施可能引入的安全问题,最后总结相关技术的发展方向与关键挑战。
Chiplet systems integrate multiple chiplets that are independently designed, manufactured, and tested, providing an important pathway for high-performance computing in the post-Moore era. However, emerging Chiplet-based architectures reshape the hardware security boundaries of conventional monolithic systems-on-chip (SoC) and introduce new requirements for security testing. This paper reviews research on hardware security threats, defense mechanisms, testing, and verification for Chiplet systems. It analyzes the applicability of existing SoC security testing techniques to Chiplet scenarios, summarizes emerging testing requirements, and proposes a Chiplet lifecycle security testing and verification process for compositional trust. The potential security risks introduced by test infrastructures are also examined, followed by a discussion of major research directions and key challenges.
Chiplet / 硬件安全 / 攻击面分析 / 安全测试与验证 / 可测试性设计
Chiplet / hardware security / attack-surface analysis / security testing and verification / design for testability
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In this paper, first, a broad overview of existing covert channel communication-based security attacks is provided. Such covert channels establish a communication link between two entities that are not authorized to share data. The secret data is encoded into different forms of signals, such as delay, temperature, or hard drive location. These signals and information are then decoded by the receiver to retrieve the secret data, thereby mitigating some of the existing security measures. The important steps of covert channel attacks are described, such as data encoding, communication protocol, data decoding, and models to estimate communication bandwidth and bit error rate. Countermeasures against covert channels and existing covert channel detection techniques are also summarized. In the second part of the paper, the implications of such attacks for emerging packaging technologies, such as 2.5D/3D integration are discussed. Several covert channel threat models for 2.5D/3D ICs are also proposed.
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